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Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

Report submitted by Canada

1. At the sixty-third session of the General Assembly, Canada supported a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (resolution 63/38). In addition, Canada co-sponsored the resolution entitled "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (resolution 63/73) and voted in favour of the resolution entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments" (resolution 63/58). Canada encourages further consultations between the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Member States in the Middle East with a view to convening a forum on the experience of other regions with existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and on the relevance of this for the Middle East.

2. Canada has called for universal and full adherence to and compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by States in the Middle East. At IAEA, Canada had actively supported the adoption of a resolution on the application of safeguards in the Middle East by the IAEA General Conference in 2005 and 2006. Canada regrets that it was unable to support this resolution in 2007 and 2008, given that changes presented by the drafters had not been the result of a consensual approach. Canada has also urged the one State signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the region that has not ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA to do so as soon as possible. Canada has appealed to all States in the region to contribute further to regional stability and security by concluding additional protocols to their respective safeguards agreements, thereby demonstrating greater openness and transparency. With regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Canada co-sponsored the resolution thereon (resolution 63/87) at the sixty-third session of the General Assembly and has also encouraged the three annex 2 signatories in the region (Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel) to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in a coordinated manner as a confidence- and security-

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building measure. Such a measure was included in the Joint Ministerial Statement at the September 2006 "Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty" ministerial event, which was held on the margins of the Assembly's high-level meetings, and in the Final Declaration of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in Vienna in September 2007.

3. Canada shares the serious international concerns about the scope and nature of the past and the ongoing nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although Canada recognizes that the Islamic Republic of Iran has a right to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, that right also comes with responsibilities. We note that the Islamic Republic of Iran has lost the confidence of the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council through its two-decade history of concealing nuclear activities. In light of this hi as well as of the failure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide any plausible justification for its efforts to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle, Canada fully supports Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008). These resolutions clearly affirm the desire of the international community for a negotiated diplomatic solution that respects the right of the Islamic Republic of Iran to engage in peaceful uses of nuclear energy while ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We welcome renewed efforts by the five permanent members of the Council and Germany in this regard and encourage the Islamic Republic of Iran to engage constructively. Canada also urges the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate fully and comply with the international obligations set out by the Council, provide "all requested information, clarifications and access" identified by IAEA as deficient and fully implement the additional protocol. Only through cooperation, transparency and renewed implementation of its additional protocol can the Islamic Republic of Iran begin to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

4. Canada remains deeply concerned about findings that point to possible undeclared nuclear material, facilities and activities in the Syrian Arab Republic, and also about possible nuclear cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. While we recognize that the Agency has faced difficulties in conducting its investigations connected with the physical challenges presented by the Dair Alzour site, we also note the very serious potential proliferation threat that would be posed by an undeclared nuclear reactor of the kind that appears to have existed at that site. With this in view, we encourage the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the IAEA investigation by providing the requested documentation in support of its declarations concerning the nature or function of the site and by granting IAEA inspectors access to all requested locations.

5. Canada has called on all remaining States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to join as non-nuclear-weapon States. As a confidence-building measure in advance of this ultimate goal, Canada has also called on these same States to separate civilian and military fuel cycles and to place all civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. These appeals are in conformity with both the policies and the actions of the Government of Canada, which include the voting record of Canada on the resolutions adopted at the sixty-third session of the General Assembly, as referred to in paragraph 1 above. They are also in conformity with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the

non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in which the Council required States to take steps to ensure that non-State actors could not manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems. These steps included, inter alia, adopting robust national legislation to prohibit the possession, manufacture or trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, in particular for terrorist purposes; developing appropriate, effective export, trans-shipment and border controls for weapons of mass destruction-related materials if those did not exist; and maintaining effective physical protection and accounting for such materials.

6. Canada recognizes the growing interest in nuclear energy among States parties in the Middle East and welcomes the announcements made by a number of such States over the past year concerning new initiatives in this field. In welcoming these initiatives, we note that all nuclear power programmes should be accompanied by the strongest commitments to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear security.